A culture of responsibility is fundamental to good stewardship in the life sciences.  Without it, we can’t safely study the pathogens that threaten health and develop new or better ways to diagnose, treat or prevent disease.  However, research that benefits public health and agriculture may also involve risk. A culture of responsibility and effective oversight for research in the life sciences is important for the protection of health.

This is especially important when dealing with select agents and toxins, agents that have the potential to pose a severe threat to both human and animal health, to plant health, or to animal and plant products.  Mishandling select agents and toxins, like the agents that cause anthrax and plague, botulinum neurotoxins, or ricin, pose serious risks to biosafety and biosecurity.  Biosafety risks refer to accidental exposure to a pathogen or toxin that could adversely affect lab workers, the general public, plants, animals and/or the environment.  Biosecurity risks come from the deliberate use of a pathogen or toxin to cause harm to humans, plants, animals, or the environment.  We need to minimize these risks so that we can conduct research safely and securely.

Effective oversight promotes biosafety and biosecurity.  A successful biosafety and biosecurity oversight framework should evolve to address new challenges, scientific advances, and social changes.  The federal government is working on a number of ongoing initiatives to refine and enhance this oversight framework.

For example, experts from across the federal government recently developed and released two key reports.   The first of these is the Recommendations of the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) and the second is the Fast Track Action Committee Report:   Recommendations on Select Agent Regulations Based on Broad Stakeholder Engagement (FTAC-SAR). These reports offer recommendations to enhance biosafety and biosecurity and the government recently developed a plan to implement these recommendations. 

The recommendations from both reports cover a variety of topics that aim to support life sciences research and improve biosafety and biosecurity while minimizing the risk involved. Implementation of the FESAP and FTAC-SAR recommendations is expected to

• enhance the culture of responsibility;
• improve oversight;
• enhance outreach and education;
• allow for the support of an applied biosafety research agenda and development of an incident reporting system;
• address material accountability;
• improve inspection processes; and
• support the development of regulatory changes and guidance to improve biosafety and biosecurity.

The FESAP also identified an approach to determine the appropriate number of high-containment U.S. laboratories required to possess, use, or transfer biological select agents and toxins. 

By embracing a culture of responsibility and taking actions that enhance biosafety and biosecurity, scientists can more safely conduct critical, lifesaving research and ultimately enhance national health security.

To find out more about the recommendations of these committees and plans for their implementation, check out the Recommendations of the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) and the Fast Track Action Committee:   Recommendations on Select Agent Regulations Based on Broad Stakeholder Engagement (FTAC-SAR). To learn more about biosafety stewardship, check out the S3 website.