

History

of the

U. S. Food and Drug Administration

Interviewee: William R. Clark

Interviewer: Ronald T. Ottens

Date: January 30, 1995

Place: Clearwater, FL

DEED OF GIFT

Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of

William R. Clark

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of [REDACTED]
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INTRODUCTION

This is a transcript of a taped oral history interview, one of a series conducted by the Food and Drug Administrations History Office. The interviews are with persons, whose recollections may serve to augment the written record. It is hoped that these narratives of things past will serve as one source along with written and pictorial source materials, for present and future researchers. The tapes and transcripts are a part of the collection of the National Library of Medicine.



Food and Drug Administration
Rockville MD 20857

TAPE INDEX SHEET

CASSETTE NUMBER(S) 1,2

GENERAL TOPIC OF INTERVIEW: History of the Food and Drug Adm.

DATE: Jan. 30, 1995 PLACE: Clearwater, FL LENGTH: 90 minutes

INTERVIEWEE

INTERVIEWER

NAME: William R. Clark

NAME: Ronald T. Ottes

ADDRESS: [REDACTED]

ADDRESS: Food and Drug Adm.

FDA SERVICE DATES: FROM 1959 TO 1989 RETIRED? Yes

TITLE: Regional Food and Drug Director
(If retired, title of last FDA position)

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RO: This is one of a series of oral interviews on the history of the Food & Drug Administration. Today, Mr. William Clark, retired regional Food & Drug director, is being interviewed in his [REDACTED] home. The date is January 30, 1995. I am Ronald Ottes. This interview will be placed in the National Library of Medicine and become a part of the Food & Drug Administration's oral history program.

Bill, to start this interview, would you give us a sketch of where you were raised and educated, any work experiences you had prior to FDA, and then we'll cover your FDA career, some of the highlights of the places and the positions that you held.

WC: Yes. Well, other than the fact that I was always in trouble as a kid . . . (Laughter) I won't go into all those details, but I was raised in a doctor's house. My dad was a doctor, and so I had degrees in biology, and chemistry, and physics.

When I was going to school at Bradley, one of the recruiters from FDA showed up. For some reason or another after being in the army, I didn't want anything to do with the government. Even though I did quite well. In a couple of years I became a master sergeant. For being drafted, that's not too bad. I did learn one thing when I was in the army. Somebody asked me, "Does anybody here know how to type?" I didn't, but I raised my hand anyway. I went out and got a book and taught myself how to type. And the next thing you know I was the master sergeant in charge of personnel.

One of the things I got out of that was I had learned how hard it was to be a secretary and what clerks had to do, you know, to make an operation run. I always appreciated my secretaries, particularly the good ones. I tried to look at things in my career that would make life a little better for them and for me.

But, anyway, someone from FDA showed up, and they showed me a career ladder and said that, "I know industry can offer you more money, but can they promise you that you'll be a GS-11 in two years?" Well, that was back in the days

when people spent their whole lives becoming GS-9s. (Laughter) As luck would have it, I flew down to St. Louis, and the first person I interviewed with was Bob Sager. I said, "How long have you been here, and when did you get promoted?" He had been there a year, and he got promoted right on time. So that sounded logical to me. I took an airplane home, and halfway home we hit a duck. It went through the windshield and blinded the pilot, and that ought to have been an omen, but it wasn't.

So I signed up for Food & Drug, and I finished my master's degree actually while I was working for FDA in St. Louis.

RO: What year was that?

WC: Nineteen fifty-nine. I was in St. Louis about two years, promoted to GS-11, and transferred to Chicago. I had been sent to Washington, D.C., and got to know Reo Duggan. I had been sent to the Division of Pharmaceutical Chemistry, and I was there for a longer time than Reo wanted me there. He said, "I'm not going to tie up one of my best drug chemists over there. If you're going to stay here, you can come over here and work for me." So I came and worked for him for a while.

RO: That was when Reo was *the* chief chemist?

WC: Oh, yes. Well, Rayfield was the top man, but Reo was the chief chemist, and he sort of ran things. He was what you call in managerial grid terms, a nine-one manager. (Laughter) But, you know, we got along fine. But he kept promising to transfer me every time I got a promotion, because that was FDA's *modus operandi*. If you got a promotion, you had to move. And so I kept getting these promotions, but they never moved me, and I'm sitting on pins and needles. So finally they transferred me laterally then to Chicago under Iman Schurman. Max Gibson was the

deputy there--both of which I thoroughly enjoyed working for. Max had been one of the first in the two-year-rotation chemist program, I believe.

It was an old lab full of problems. Little did I know at the time that I was going to end up there for so long. (Laughter) But they had some good people like Al Woodsen, who I thought was one of the finest men we had in our laboratory. He was a GS-12 when he died and did a lot of work in mercury electrode procedures. I don't know whether working with the mercury created some problems for him or not, but I think he did have some nervous problems.

Then I was transferred to a fellow in Baltimore, as I recall, by the name of Ron Ottes. (Laughter) Who . . . One time when he went on vacation called me up when he got back and said, "What did you do? I don't know whether to kiss you or fire you." (Laughter) So we had some troubled employees that I remember at that time. It wasn't that I did anything because he was gone. It was because the opportunity came up, and I didn't think he would mind in the long run. So I went ahead and got rid of some of those people. I don't even remember who they were now.

RO: In St. Louis, what was the major program, industry programs that you had in St. Louis?

WC: Well, if you remember, back in those days, FDA hired a chemist to do everything. If you wanted a microbiologist, you hired a chemist and made a microbiologist out of him. They did a lot of filth work. You know, there was some drug work there, but it really wasn't as much as we got in Chicago or Baltimore either, for that matter. And there was justification for closing St. Louis. At the time I didn't think so, but I do now.

It became a national drug center mainly to, I think, accommodate many of the people that were there so that we didn't lose some pretty good people, like Harold

Tepper, and Matthew Dow, and Bob Herd. Mary Ann Kreinbaum was there. I remember all of those people were good chemists.

Although, one of the things that struck me at that time, outside of Bob Herd, Jim Cannon, and myself, everybody had B.S. degrees. I remember making a bet with one of the fellows one time that everybody knew what a Fridel Crafts reaction was, and he said, "There isn't a person in this laboratory who knows what a Fridel Crafts reaction is." And I said, "I'll bet you five dollars." You know, I lost that five dollars. But it impressed me, and I vowed that if I ever got the opportunity, I was going to try to get some more advanced degrees in the Food & Drug. I think later on we did accomplish that both in Cincinnati, and Minneapolis, and other places. Although I understand Chicago was closed very recently.

RO: Yes. There's a number of those that are destined for closure.

WC: I remember when Dr. Lipscomb was the chief chemist. We were all called in to a meeting, and they were talking about what we could do with some of the laboratories. I said, "Why don't we create an FDA training academy?" And he thought it was a good idea at the time. It sort of stuck in the back of my mind that hopefully some day one of the labs in Region V--what was then called Region V--could end up being that way. Well, Chicago did somewhat, as far as the instrumentation went, because remember Georgetown was the main training facility. Because, you know, when I joined FDA, and the same way with you, the most sophisticated piece of equipment we had was an old Beckman DU with a car battery as a power source. And when I left, everything was done by computer.

I remember one summer being in pharmaceutical chemistry, and they had hired a young girl whose job it was to take Krebiezon and go through the files and compare Krebiezon with all the known chemicals. It took her most of the summer before she realized it was creatine. Today, the same thing could be done in about

five seconds with the new computer technology. So we've come a long ways; there's no question about it.

RO: Well, you remember, Bill, when they first got the recording spectrophotometers, we used to say, "My gosh, they will never have money to buy the paper for those things." Because before that we would get halfway through some drug analyses and run out of solvent.

WC: I remember those days. Right. We probably ought to go from Chicago to Baltimore, where while I was there Maurice Kinslow became the director. Winton Rankin came out and tried to prepare us for Maurice. He was the first district director who had not come up through the ranks. Well, I found out from talking to Winton later that he was concerned about how the district would act on that particular problem. But they accepted him, because Maurice was a good manager. There were some hard feelings at first, I think, but it passed. There wasn't anything that lasted.

RO: No. I remember when Winton came out, and I was the chief chemist there at that time, and he asked me if I'd be able to work for someone as the district director that hadn't come up through the ranks.

WC: I remember going to . . . It must have been an AFDO meeting or something in New Orleans, and I roomed with Nevis Cook. And he said, "When Goddard became commissioner, Rankin's job was to go around and interview all the old time district directors and see how to get rid of them." And Nevis said, "I told Winton if he doesn't like the way I'm doing something, he can get rid of me." And he said, "And he did." Of course, Nevis was one of the few district directors that came back later and reclaimed his job. But most of them were gone.

RO: Yes. There was a group of them. They sent them out into the regional HEW (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) offices.

WC: Right. And I forget what they . . . Associate commissioners, I think they were called. And then while I was in Baltimore, I started working with . . . I think you may have made the contact with Dr. Banes, and I ended up being the joint co-publisher of the FDA drug analytical manual, and I got a lot of help from Joyce Hundley. I don't know what ever happened to Joyce. I think she started having a family of her own. But she was a top-notch chemist. She did a lot to help out getting that done, because I was a supervisor at the time, and she did a lot of legwork. But there were a lot of good chemists in Baltimore. There was Mike Rogers and the top pesticide chemist.

RO: John Wessel.

WC: John Wessel. Right. I remember when I first got to Baltimore, the government wouldn't pay per diem. The moving costs were very, very bad. I was in the old Monument Hotel with all the other weird people in Baltimore. But my per diem was about to run out, and I think I got an assignment to Washington on a thirty-day detail, which helped tremendously.

I remember working with the old fellow from New York, Harry Rogavitz. One of the things that struck me was that we were getting a report every week on something or other. Some report that headquarters wanted every week, and I noticed all that he was doing was filing it in the drawer. I said, "Why are we doing this?" He says, "Well, we're required to do it." I said, "Why are we required to do it?" "Well, because they asked us." (Laughter) And I think I called you. We stopped sending it after that. But it was an interesting experience, because BFA, I think it was called back in those days, was short for Bureau of Field Administration.

RO: Do you remember, Bill, some of things you were supposed to supervise there in Baltimore?

WC: Yes. I was in charge of everything. I think what you did, when I first got there, you knew I was a drug chemist, and you put me in charge of everything but. (Laughter) I had the microbiologists and the pesticide lab, and I had Joyce, the research coordinator, which frankly was a wise thing to do, because I did learn . . . I broadened my knowledge, because I was very illiterate when it came to microbiology.

RO: Well, that was one of things I remember, because we'd gotten microbiologists. I didn't know anything about microbiology.

WC: And so you gave it to me. (Laughter)

RO: Nobody else did either, but . . .

WC: Well, I did have a degree in biology anyway. But that helped. But it was the other kind of biology. It wasn't the microbiology. But, anyway, fortunately good or bad or indifferent, when we hired Bill Hebert, although I know a lot of people didn't like Bill or he didn't seem to do well, I got along with him. And for whatever it's worth, I learned a lot from him.

Then in pesticides . . . About that time I was reading some books on creativity. So we sat down, and we were going to come up with a new idea every day. And it may have been to cancel the idea we had the day before. I remember we developed new glassware and new procedures. The whole idea was to cut down the amount of time it took to run the assay. Then about that time I think we had to move the lab into a smaller place, and I remember Mike Rogers was coming unglued.

One of the things I felt bad about was that they had a pesticide conference, and I sent Mike to that pesticide conference. And Reo Duggan was a real believer in that . . . Oh, it was study of the average meal of a nineteen-year-old. Remember that?

RO: Total Diet Study.

WC: Total Diet Study. That's it. And there was a pesticide in there that broke down in water in about eighteen minutes. The sample was prepared, and about a month later, we ran it. No, it wasn't that long, was it? I can't remember the pesticide now. But I kept saying, "Why are we doing this?" I mean, it's . . . We never found any either, and it was obvious we weren't going to find any.

So I told Mike to go to a pesticide conference and raise the issue, and he told me that Reo would shoot him out of the water. I said, "Well, call everybody in advance, get it lined up, and when you go in there, you have some support." Well, he did that, and he shot Reo down. But Reo never forgot it. And the next thing I know, Mike Rogers is ending up at a Perrine, Florida, assignment, I think it was. Oh, my goodness. What have I done to this poor kid? So when I . . . The first chance I got, when I became the district director in Chicago, and John Taylor was the lab director, I got Mike to come into Chicago as supervisory chemist.

RO: It could have happened.

WC: Reo was pretty strong willed when it came to things like that. But it all turned out well. I think Mike's done well since. I haven't heard too much. But he was in Kansas City, I think, the last time I heard. Is he still . . .

RO: He's the district director, yes.

WC: Well, he's done well. He's doing well. Good.

RO: Do you remember some of the other programs that we were really active in at that time? You were there from what years?

WC: I was there two years, and then the Executive Development Program started.

RO: You were there when Dr. Goddard was commissioner, weren't you?

WC: Right. And I got selected for the Executive Development Program, and I can remember going to staff meetings, and everybody would be waiting for Dr. Goddard to show up. When he walked into the room, you knew it. Even if you weren't looking at him. The hair . . . I don't know what it was, the electricity or something. The man just exhibited a tremendous amount of presence. When he walked in the room, everybody knew it, and he took charge.

I remember later having a conversation with Winton Rankin. He said that Dr. Goddard was an extremely creative person, but he needed somebody to keep him out of trouble, because he was . . . I mean, he was prone to go off the deep end, and I think that's what Winton felt his job was, was trying to keep Dr. Goddard out of trouble.

Then I remember when Dr. Goddard finally quit. He was interviewed by a couple of the interns, and he said his biggest problem was that he began to believe what the press said about him, and he had a tremendous ego, and he realized it at the end.

Then there were a lot of these things happening when I was in the Executive Development Program that exposed me. I was assigned as project officer in charge of the Kaiser Permanente project. While I was there . . . This was so many years ago. This was early sixties I guess it was, '69 through '70, somewhere in there. Kaiser Permanente had everything done by automation. You go in, and the first

multi-phasic physical examination was done by Kaiser, and all the auto analyzers were done by Kaiser. So I got really acquainted with automated analysis at that point.

The computers that they had were light-pen activated. The doctors could go into the office, and he could put the light pen by the patient's name, and it would give the patient's medical records just "boom" right up on the screen. He could enter diagnoses, he could enter medication all by that. They had control of 100 percent of the inpatient drugs, about 80 percent of the outpatient drugs were controlled by FDA's control system.

With a physical given every year by a population of 600,000, we were hoping to find any adverse drug reactions that were of a minor nature. In other words, if you lost hearing slowly over a period of time, and the common denominator showed that all these people had taken the same drugs, then while the individual might just think he's getting older, it would trigger an alarm that this ought to be looked into from the standpoint the drug caused hearing loss--or any other malady that might be involved.

What I learned there that later when I got to Chicago, and I worked with Larry and Mack, worked on automated computers, we started going in the automated assay work.

RO: You said Larry and Mack.

WC: Larry Albert and Mack Overton. The difference we did was . . . If you remember, everybody . . . We'd get a contract to see how we ought to do things. We'd hire a computer expert to tell us how to run our computers. What we did different in Chicago was we took chemists and made them computer experts, because if we'd gone the other way, we'd have been down the wrong path for sure. Larry and Mack showed an interest in doing that, and they did an outstanding job. And, of course Dr. Smith. He was the head of the department of chemistry at Northwestern,

and he developed a tumor at the base of his skull. But he was an expert in automation and computers, and with his help, we were able to develop the auto-analyzers in Chicago.

RO: Excuse me, Bill, I think you're ahead of yourself.

WC: I am. It happens.

RO: But you were in the Executive Development Program.

WC: Back to the Executive Development Program. OK.

RO: No. I was just wondering when you left the Executive Development Program and then when you . . .

WC: Let's see. Sixty . . . October, or August of '69 I was transferred as deputy director of the Chicago district.

RO: And who was the director at that time?

WC: Sam Hart was the regional director at the time and the district director who had been promoted to regional director. If you remember, what they did when they made regional directors is they took whoever was in the major city except San Francisco. I was working for Winton Rankin when this was done.

RO: Kinslow was in Baltimore, and the region was out of Philadelphia at that time. But Kinslow was made the regional director for Region III.

WC: Regional director. OK. But I remember Rankin calling . . . Oh, boy. The fellow that was the district director in San Francisco. He had some health problems, but Winton Rankin, I worked with him for six years . . .

RO: McKay McKinnon?

WC: McKay McKinnon. He said, "McKay," he says, "I've heard you've had some health problems." And, of course, McKay came right along and said, "Yes, I have." He said, "Well, we're in the process of making decisions on the regional Food & Drug directors, and I didn't want to saddle you with that responsibility until I had a chance to talk to you. And I was sort of thinking about giving it to Fred Lofsvold." Is that right? Is it Fred or was there a Clark up there?

RO: Frank Clark.

WC: Frank Clark. Yes, because Fred came along later. I'm getting ahead of myself again. And he knew that he was going to say . . . Well, one thing about McKay McKinnon, he could see the writing on the wall, and he agreed to it right there. And it was handled so well, I couldn't believe it.

Winton Rankin was probably one of the best instructors I recall ever having. The man was a genius, because he'd call a meeting, and there were people with totally opposing points of view about how to do something. He would listen to what they had to say on both sides, and then he would start with the little finger, and he's start working towards the thumb, reiterating every point that they had brought up. But he'd do it in a different logical order, so by the time he got to the thumb, everybody knew what the decision was, because it sounded logical. And he was a gentleman. He never lost his temper, and he sacrificed himself for the agency.

I probably knew more about Winton than anybody else, because he was always yelling about these leaks that were happening at Food & Drug about the time that

CPEHS (Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Service) was threatening Food & Drug Administration. At one point in time, he even asked me to carry the documents to the press. (Laughter) So I know how they got there. I can talk about it now, I guess, because he's already retired. I get a Christmas card from him every year, but . . . The man sacrificed himself for the agency.

In fact, one of my jobs was to set up the National Center for Microbiological Investigations (NCMI). When I was working on the self-certification program with Green Giant, I had to develop some microbiological standards, and I had worked with Harold . . .

RO: Leininger.

WC: . . . Leininger. And Harold was such an easy person to work with, and he seemed like almost . . . He fit into the field so well I recommended him for the job, and Winton went along with it. But I remember that CPEHS came up, was going to take over Food & Drug, and we had to set up . . . We didn't want to have to ask them to set up NCMI. So I had . . . I think I had less than a week to do all the paperwork, get everybody on board, and create that agency. Well, we did . . . We took the existing staff, made them the staff, and assigned Harold and made it a fact before Charlie Johnson--I think was the head of CPEHS then--could stop it.

RO: Was Harold Leininger still in headquarters at that time? He was with the Division of Microbiology.

WC: He was with the Division of Microbiology. But he'd been very helpful in the General Foods and Green Giant's self-certification agreement. I can remember there were a couple of other assignments I had. One of them I had to do was go through Mr. Rankin's files and see who hadn't turned in their reports. It seemed like Ken Kirk was on that list more than he should have been. (Laughter) I remember

being out in the hall one day, and Ken Kirk came up to me. He all but grabbed me by the shirt collar, and says, "What are you doing? Digging up all the dead wood in this organization?" (Laughter) I went into Mr. Rankin, and I said, "I think I just made an enemy." And he says, "No," he says, "You were doing what I told you to do. I'll take care of it."

The funny thing that happened was not only was Mr. Kirk very nice to me after that, he went out and hired his own assistant. I think that was Larry Ormsbee who became his assistant. I remember he was very helpful to Larry at that time. Although Larry made a serious mistake of switching over to become chief inspector after he left that associate job. They put him in the . . . It was like putting a square peg in a round hole. It just didn't work. It sort of messed up his career, I think, a little bit.

I took a course in managerial grid. While I was there, there was a fellow by the name of Voyce Whitley in the Bureau of Foods who I got to know. I thought this guy looks like he ought to go some place. I introduced him to the fellow that was in charge of the Executive Development Program. Anyway, meanwhile . . .

RO: Mickey Moure.

WC: No, no. It got further down. The guy that did the day-to-day job. Anyway, to make a long story short, the next thing I know they picked him up, and he ended up being in charge of the EEO, I guess of the field. So that was a lucky pick. Let's see.

Then also I had learned about word processors while I was on that Kaiser Permanente thing. Then when I was in Chicago, we started . . .

(Interruption)

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WC: We started the first word processing in Chicago, and, of course, the . . . That's where George really helped me out, because he went along and did a lot of the legwork in trying to get the first word processors. I remember going to an RFDD meeting. I was an acting RFDD. I remember . . . I shouldn't mention names, but one of the two regional directors said, "You're just playing with a toy. It will never amount to anything." I wish I could talk to those people now. I've got one in my own bedroom back there. They're so cheap now, and they save so much work.

RO: Well, we've got to the point that whenever you were going to replace the typewriter, nobody wanted a typewriter. You got a word processor.

WC: Some of them were pretty difficult for . . . Now that they've got icon Windows management, it's pretty simple. We had a lot of trouble. I think there were about five or ten thousand dollars if I remember in the early days for just a word processor, which was kind of expensive to say the least. But I think they're standard now.

RO: Well, word processors are obsolete now, and everybody has to have a computer, a personal computer.

WC: Well, you know, you can do everything on a personal computer now that you could do with a word processor and more.

RO: Sure.

WC: Well, I have WordPerfect 6.0 on mine.

Let's see. Where was I? Back in Washington . . . Well, I no sooner got assigned to Chicago . . . When you're in the Executive Development Program, you're anxious to get your next job. About that time, CPEHS came along--or HEW. I think it was during the Nixon administration. They had this . . . Some project and it had

the words two thousand in it. Anyway, the whole concept was to get the political cronies into the various government positions, and in order for any of the executives in the Executive Development Program to get a job, we had to compete with all these people that were on this list. And I was worried sick, I know.

I kept getting offers, and Winton Rankin wouldn't let me take the job. I got a job to go to the Bureau of Medicine, and he said, "You don't want to go over there." He says, "Good people go over there, and they never hear from them again." (Laughter) Then finally, this job . . . He says, "I want you to apply for Chicago as the deputy director." And I said, "You know I was in Chicago before. Is that a good idea?" He says, "Yes, I think you can handle it." And so . . . "But," he says, "I can't promise you anything." Well, that same day, I go over to talk to Sam Fine. He says, "Oh, you've got the job." (Laughter) "What are you talking about?" They had greased the skids or something like that. But, anyway, I got the job.

The day I got to Chicago . . . I think it was the day that Sam Hart went to Product Safety or something. He disappeared, and there was no district director, no regional director, and I was the deputy director. And then they sent Tom Brown in for thirty days, and then they sent Jim Beebe in for thirty days. When Jim left, he said, "Well, why don't you just let Bill run it?" I ran it for I don't know how long, many months.

But the one thing I learned during that period of time was I couldn't figure out why they needed a regional district, a district director, a deputy director. So I wrote a paper reorganizing the field, and I sent it to Paul Hile. I got this telephone call from Paul Hile. He says, "Don't you dare tell anybody about that paper that you wrote, because we're going to implement it." The next thing I know . . . Well, I was the deputy director, and I recommended the abolishment of my own job, and I hadn't had a year in grade yet. I really got shook up when he said he was going to do this. (Laughter) Well, to make a long story short, I ended up being the district director at Chicago.

RO: Who was the chief chemist at that time there?

WC: Let me go back. Doctor . . . No, Dr. Schurman wasn't there anymore.

RO: Was John Taylor still there?

WC: No, I hired John Taylor.

RO: As chief chemist?

WC: As chief chemist. Who left before him? Was it Max? Max wasn't chief chemist. Maybe the slot was never . . . Oh, wait a minute. I know who it was. The fellow that went to . . . I won't mention names, because he went to New York and got in a little trouble out there.

RO: Bob Martin.

WC: OK. That's who it was. I know he called me up on the phone and swore he didn't do it, and then he called up later and said, "I'm sorry, I lied to you."

RO: Well, who was the chief inspector at that time?

WC: That was Owen Lamb.

RO: Owen Lamb. Oh, yes.

WC: Owen had the type of personality that rubbed everybody the wrong way, but he was extremely competent. One of the mistakes you could make if you managed a person like Owen, you could overreact and end up doing something stupid, because

you were trying to do just the opposite of what he said to do. He was right most of the time. He just had a way with his peer group. And Frank Hereford and Owen never got along at all.

RO: Was Frank Hereford . . . ?

WC: He was the compliance director. I really had the bear by the tail there for a while.

RO: Well, now Chicago was a big drug district. You had Abbott Laboratories and a number of other ones to deal with. Did you ever encounter any serious problems with Abbott Laboratories and some of those other firms?

WC: Yes, we did. We had that Large Volume Parenterals (LVP) problem which caused septicemia. Do you remember? Tylenol broke in Chicago.

RO: Were you district director then or regional food director?

WC: I was district director when that hit. I remember when the mushrooms broke . . . Well, I was detailed to Cincinnati on a Monday, I think it was; or I got there on Sunday, and on Monday it broke. The mushrooms with botulism. Do you remember that one? And I thought, "Boy, do I walk into things here." (Laughter)

But I remember when I hired John Taylor as the district lab director, I remember that night breaking out into a cold sweat, because his secretary was a bigot. Not just an ordinary bigot, but number one bigot. (Laughter) And didn't mind who knew it, and she quit over the fact that John was black. She came into me, and she says, "I'm not . . . I'm not a hypocrite. I'm going to quit." So he hired Darlene, I think, Darlene Bailey as his secretary.

John and Owen didn't get along. A couple of times I threatened . . . In fact, I think I finally did tell them that they were going to switch jobs. I remember John came in and said, "He'll ruin my laboratory." And about three minutes later, Owen came in. He says, "He'll ruin my inspection branch." (Laughter) I said, "Well, we're going to find out, because you're both going to switch." And it turned out fine. They did well after that. I think it was just what they needed.

I always . . . I kept getting details. I got sent to Winchester Engineering and Analytical Center (WEAC) when it became part of the field. Gladys Murphy was the secretary then, and she helped me a lot. A good secretary can be a tremendous help. And the same way when I went to Cincinnati . . . Bonnie Dodson was her name. She was really a top notch . . .

I remember one day. I'm a messy person, but I have an organized mess on my desk. The first day I was there I had this organized mess on my desk, and I came in early in the morning, and my desk was clean. I said, "My Lord, I'll never find anything." I went downstairs and got a cup of coffee, and when I came back, my organized mess was put back exactly the way I'd left it the night before. She'd not only took everything and put it away and cleaned up my desk, but she put it back the way I'd left it, which I was really impressed with, I've got to tell you. Not too many girls could do that.

RO: Bill, do you remember any specifics about the Tylenol tampering?

WC: Oh, yes. There was . . . I've got so many crises, I've got to remember. Don't get them mixed up. I was . . . Where was I? I was in Minneapolis, I think. Anyway, I was out of town, and I got a call from Phil Scheeler, I believe it was, saying that they'd had a death. I got this call at 2:00 in the morning. That they'd had a death in a hospital in . . . I believe it was Elmhurst. I'm not sure. All I remember was that my daughter was working in a hospital in Elmhurst. (Laughter) I was really concerned. Then the next one was a patient who died at Central

DuPage Hospital who got their Tylenol at Frank's Grocery Store where I bought my groceries.

And I remember saying to my staff, I said, "If anybody here thinks that this is something out there that we just do, they're out there to save their families. You'd better get out there and check this for the protection of every one of your loved ones, as well as the public. Because it could happen to anybody." And I do remember I personally went around and looked at every site where we had found contaminated bottles, trying to look for a common denominator. The only thing I could figure out, there was a Standard Oil station next to every one of them, and whether that was a . . . But that was so bizarre that I never made more of it, other than the fact that I just mentioned it to the, I think it was the Illinois Bureau of Investigations.

RO: How many deaths were there? Do you remember?

WC: I don't know. There were three or four. It's been so long ago.

RO: They never did find the person responsible for the tampering? Did they?

WC: Well, there was a man who had written some threatening letters to Johnson & Johnson, and they arrested him on extortion, and when they arrested him, they put him away, and the Tylenol thing stopped. We did actually find a capsule on the shelf by the way. If anybody had looked at the capsule, the capsule was . . . Cyanide would pick up moisture and turn black and discolor the capsule, and so anyone who would look at the capsule first would have been able to spot it. That's one of the things we were looking for. Also, it was opaque, I think, to x-ray. We were x-raying them after a while.

And then we had the Cincinnati lab with this elemental analysis capability, and we were able to tell the lot and the manufacturer of every lot on the market, and we were able to tell who manufactured, and what lot it was on the cyanide in the

contaminated capsules that we found. So they did a beautiful piece of work in Cincinnati with that capability. That's what I remember most about it, I guess. Other than the fact that we had a bunch of me-toos after that.

That same lab by the way did catch a few people, but not with the Tylenol. There was some Red Devil lye, I think it was. But they could also pick up glass. There was . . . Remember when Beech Nut--either Gerber or Beech Nut--well, maybe both of them, were getting glass in the baby food, and they were able to show that the glass that one of the consumers found in their Gerber wasn't Gerber's glass. It was glass out of their own dishwasher. The woman finally admitted that she had done it. So they did some nice work in Cincinnati. No question about it.

RO: You mentioned that Abbott Large Volume Parenterals recall, and . . . Were you district director or RFDD?

WC: I was district director then, and I remember that was the first time that I had ever been on television. And somebody . . . I got calls from all over the country saying they'd seen me on television. I was in a state of panic, of course, being as it was the first time. I didn't know what I was going to expect, but . . .

RO: What about Biotest? Wasn't Biotest a Chicago firm when they were indicted for fraudulent reports?

WC: I don't remember that. I remember krebiezon when I was there the first time. We got rid of most of our small drug manufacturers. Myzel Labs was one of them that we got rid of, and . . . In fact, I remember in one injunction case that the lawyer asked the judge not to allow Food & Drug to have the injunction, because everybody that they'd ever had an injunction with went out of business. (Laughter) He ran for senator, you know, against Stevenson. He's the top Food & Drug lawyer. Oh, my. My memory's going, I tell you.

RO: Burditt.

WC: George Burditt. Sure. Thank you. I knew you could come up with it if I kept giving you hints. (Laughter) Well, let's see.

RO: What about infant formula? You had a number of manufacturers in your region, and I don't remember whether you were the regional Food & Drug director at the time, but Detroit District had a number of infant formula manufacturers.

WC: Yes. I think it came under Detroit's, most of it. Gerber was in their district.

RO: Gerber and Wyeth.

WC: And Wyeth, yes. We handled most of them. We had good district directors in Region V for the most part.

RO: Maybe we're jumping ahead a little bit to when you were the regional Food & Drug director--but I was wondering about the strengths and weaknesses of your individual district directors, because you had Detroit, and Cincinnati, and, of course, Chicago, and then Minneapolis.

WC: Well, Al Hoeting could have been a regional director any day of the week--no question about that. Jim Simmons . . . They were all different, but they were all good. The one thing . . . When I was a district director, I remember we were competing for funds, you know. And I remember asking Don Heaton, why is Cliff Shane getting so much money and I'm not, and this, that, and the other thing. We didn't . . . Back then, we were budgeted on what we'd always spent. There was no baseline budget, there was no starting from scratch, why are you doing it this way, and why are you getting this much money?

Don Heaton was the regional director then, and I think the fact that I asked the question . . . In fact, I think that's when he decided to leave the Chicago district facility, because he was being accused of giving Chicago preferential treatment. Because I ended up getting more money before it was over with. By baseline budgeting, I could show that we had more of a need for it than some of the other districts that were getting it, and . . .

But one of the things, on the evaluation procedure, I gave heavy credit to those that helped the other guy get his job done. All of my district directors, they would look for ways in which they could help the other person, and they all did it. John Feldman did it. I picked John Feldman because the district, you know, when NCMI first started, they put Harold Leininger out with the secretaries, and Winton Rankin said, "I'm going to close that district." He was going to close the Minneapolis district and turn it over to NCMI totally, and I got on the telephone and called up Joe Durham, one of the directors then.

I said, "Joe, why did you put him out there?" He said, "Well, that's the only space I've got." And I said, "Suppose it was NCMI's facility, and you had to go to him for space." He says, "You've made your point. He'll have an office tomorrow." (Laughter) And so that solved that problem. They got along.

Then when Henry Roberts retired--because Henry got, you know, Henry solved a lot of the problems there. He worked well with Harold Leininger. Harold had left, and John Feldman had taken over, and I thought, "Well, maybe it's time that John Feldman became a district director to try and make that work together."

In fact, when I was at WEAC, that was still during the Tylenol problem, I had been sent out there before it was finished. We were making recalls. One of the national emergencies came up. And one of the ways I figured that we could get, they were headquarters-type people, on board with the field was to put them out making recall checks. They knew the territory, and I felt they needed to see how the other half worked. It worked out pretty good.

RO: You had started in some, I think, laboratory consolidations in Region II so that each one of the districts did not have a complete laboratory. Isn't that right?

WC: Well, the instrumentation became expensive. NMR (Nuclear Magnetic Resonance) mass specs, gas liquid chromatographs, computerized infrareds were very expensive pieces of equipment. The instrumental analysis lab in Cincinnati required special technology in order to build this equipment. They built their own mass specs as I recall. They had this . . . The plasma that produced the flame there was about six or seven times as hot as the sun, and you could melt the glassware if you didn't design it properly. They were using inert gases, and gases are expensive. And so in order to cut down on the costs, we had three of the . . . How many . . . ? I don't remember how many national labs we had, but we had three of them in Region V. There were what, eight or something like that nationally?

RO: Yes. I think there were about that many.

WC: About that many. I don't remember totally where they all are. There was some talk of consolidating the micro lab in Denver. I don't know. Did they ever do that? Never did. NCMI is still there?

RO: They're still operating as far as I know. Of course, they've got a lot of plans down the road now for consolidation.

WC: I heard they were going to close Chicago.

RO: In several years, they're going to have a big national laboratory at Little Rock out at NCTR.

WC: Oh, I got involved in that, too, didn't I? (Inaudible) I had forgotten about that. I don't remember . . . I remember making a trip down to Little Rock, because there was some talk about FDA taking over that facility, and it had been part of the testing facility for the army.

RO: Well, there for a time back in the early seventies, we were going to have, not a laboratory at NCTR, but we were going to have a resident post. Charlie Edwards was the commissioner at that time, and he said, "Wait now. That is going to be a research laboratory. We don't want anything regulatory connected with it at all." So that was the end then of the field having a presence there. At least now they're thinking about putting a laboratory there, and that's probably a good idea for the exchange of instrumentation and the scientific knowledge and things.

WC: I can remember having a discussion with Daniel Banes about that, about the separation of regulatory and non-regulatory labs. And we both came to the same conclusion that it would last for one generation, because the minute that the people who were in this so-called highly specialized non-regulatory laboratory no longer could relate to the field. The research they did would be totally independent and totally unusable by the field laboratory. And he agreed with that. Of course, he was from the field originally, so . . .

RO: But then there was a point in his career when he thought . . .

WC: . . . just the opposite. That's right. He did have a problem with that. I did fight him tooth and nail on that, I remember. But we didn't ever get ugly about it. I mean, we were always friends. It was just a gentle difference of opinion. I had a lot of respect for him.

Now where am I? I'm back at . . . I can remember the facility being so old and decrepit and full of cockroaches and too much cold air in the summer and too

much hot air in the winter. And I remember the place needed to be painted. So I asked the post office. They said it would be \$20,000 to paint the facility, and we didn't have that kind of money. The Chicago staff said, "Well, if you can get the paint, we'll paint it." And I think that was the first purple laboratory in Food & Drug. (Laughter) We had a Chinese lab, we had a pink and green--let's see--the yellow and green lab, that was the micro lab. We had a blue and purple lab. Anyway, we sure did get so-called gray and brown out of the picture. Then it was shortly after that some of the other districts . . . I think Henry started painting some of the labs up in Minneapolis. But we got . . . We broke the cycle anyway with the old army gray or navy gray and army brown.

RO: Well, the laboratory was so bad that for a while you didn't do filth analysis there, did you?

WC: Well, we couldn't . . . It was difficult doing . . . We had to ignore certain pesticides, because we had cockroaches. In fact, when we tore that one wall down, the joke was we didn't have to carry the debris off because the cockroaches carried it off. And, you know, we kept trying to make the point that it was . . . Finally, finally, we did get the new lab, which was day and night, quite a difference. But we had to ignore certain pesticides, because the post office would come up and spray, and we didn't know when they were going to do it, we didn't have control over the facility, and . . .

RO: Well, the regional office moved out of the facility that the district office was in, didn't it?

WC: And they moved over on Jackson Street I think it was, because when I became regional director, I went over there. Then we were told we had to move. We went over to an insurance building. Then finally we ended up on Michigan Avenue, which

is a pretty nice facility. It overlooked the lake. I'd get up at 4:00 in the morning and catch the 5:15 train into Chicago, because some of my region was in the eastern time zone, and also, if you wanted to get a hold of anybody in Washington, you had to get them before 8:00, and . . . Because they were in meetings all day long. (Laughter) You remember that? So I would see the sunrise come up over the lake, and it was just gorgeous.

RO: Were you district director when the regional office was co-located in the same building?

WC: Yes.

RO: Were there any problems there with the RFDD sticking his nose in the district's business?

WC: I didn't think so. I mean, I got along fine with Don, and Don seemed to be gone most of the time anyway, so . . . No, I just sort of . . . He might have thought that he was being overly nosy, but . . . And I think the other . . . I think the main reason he left was not that I had a problem with it, but that the other district directors did. I remember Don being a very helpful regional director.

None of us had ever thought that we needed regional offices. Even when I was regional director, I didn't think we needed them. In fact, my job I felt as regional director was to see that I, you know, I did as little to interfere with the district directors as I could. There were a lot of reports that I remember as district director to me that seemed to be an awful waste of time, particularly in the Consumer . . . I spent more time managing the Consumer Affairs Department than I think I did the rest of the district.

RO: Well, what about that program?

WC: It was an outstanding . . . We had a lot of . . . When we first got started, for a necessity, we hired people that were self-starters, very strong-willed peopled. They built the Consumer Affairs program, basically Blanche Erkel in Minneapolis and Marguerette Robinson in Chicago, and Diane Place in Detroit and . . . As I remember, Cincinnati was . . . Well, I know who ended up there, but anyway . . . Then they hired Dr. . . . Oh, boy. Well, anyway, they hired . . . Don hired a Ph.D. to manage that program from the regional office.

RO: I can see her as plain as day, but I can't think of her name.

WC: It will come to me eventually. And the . . . In fact, I even still get Christmas--well, I did until a few years ago--I'd get a Christmas card from her. Dr. Dunn. And the reason I remembered was because her way of shaking hands. She would come up to somebody and say, "My name's Dr. Dunn, and what degree do you have?" (Laughter) And she did that. I'm not kidding you. Bert Scribner was the first one I remember her doing that with. (Laughter) And I remember I, you know, I even painted her room for her, and we tried to make her at home. She was still in the district, which was really on top of everything when she first got there. But she and the other old-time consumer affairs people did not get along. It was probably to say hate was a better emotion than was exercised there. Then she hired her own pick in Cincinnati. I remember that now. Of course, if she hired them, she had a loyalty to them, and that relationship worked. But it was because they suddenly found two bosses that the others couldn't accept it.

(Interruption)

WC: Yes, Marie Ekvall, worked with Marguerette Robinson in Chicago, was able to get along somewhat with Dr. Dunn. But even . . . Don and I probably had more discussions over our Consumer Affairs program than most anything we had discussed.

But . . . Then when Dr. Dunn, I believe she retired or resigned, went back to school or something, she went back to Wisconsin anyway, and we never did recreate that post. I think that was a failed experience.

RO: Diane Place was in Detroit.

WC: Detroit, right.

RO: And wasn't there some trouble between Al Hoeting and Diane Place towards the end of her career?

WC: Yes. She filed a discrimination complaint, I think. You know, I don't remember all of the details, because I'm not sure she pursued it all. I think they made up before it was over, and it may have been as a result of Dr. Dunn. Al was carrying--a good soldier--carried out his orders from Don, and Don was trying to make it work, he was trying to make it work, and Diane wasn't going to have any part of it. Once that irritation was removed, Diane was very positive.

I remember working with her to try and get a Canadian . . . See, they had a common border with Canada, and we wanted . . . We were working with Canada in so many other areas--this was when I was regional director--that I tried to get some cross the border things going, because they use the same drugs we do. So they had complaints that we didn't see, and we wanted to know about it, so we wanted to be able to talk to their consumer people. In fact, the Canadians . . . We were further advanced in a lot of technologies as opposed to Canadians. Many of them came over. And I remember Charlie Phillips would go up to Canada and put on courses for them, and that would be in the Food area.

RO: Food service area?

WC: Food service, right. Charlie was an outstanding . . . Both Charlie Price and Charlie Phillips turned out to be really top-notch people. I remember sitting in on Charlie Phillips' course, and I learned a lot from him that I could use at home for that matter in terms of sanitation. Whenever I went into a restaurant after that, there were an awful lot of things I observed that I wouldn't have even picked up on before, like using the same rag, you know, to wipe your seat that you do the table top, and some things like that. I think they used a quaternary ammonium salt to sanitize the rags. The way the freezers were set up that led to a lot of problems, and then they . . .

Remember the salmonella in milk? That was another crisis made in Chicago. I can remember my granddaughter being hospitalized with symptoms that seemed to me to be related to salmonella. She was tested negative for salmonella, but she was a heavy milk drinker, and we got her milk from Jewell. I remember talking to the nurse at the children's section of the hospital. She said that they'd had a large number of children coming in with those same symptoms, and actually before I could even get it out of my mouth, we started picking up on the salmonella in the milk.

It was salmonella typhonerium, which is not common, and we did a survey of all the herds in Wisconsin. None of the herds came up with that particular organism. It was an organism which was penicillin resistant, and, of course, the doctors weren't aware of it and treated the salmonella infection with penicillin and killed off its competition. Of course, then it could accelerate without any competition. It made the condition worse. The older people and the very young people . . . We had, I think, one older woman died, and some of the younger ones were very sick. I believe, we had nine deaths.

It was interesting, because when it broke we were in Indiana at a milk conference. We had an annual meeting of all the state milk people, and they were all there. When it broke, we had to send them all home and break up the meeting to deal with the problem. The states were responsible for it. Most of the health problems were in Illinois, around the Chicago area.

But if I were to pick a quality control that would have, you know, from a strictly technical standpoint, that was one of the top milk dairies in the country. You never expected that dairy to have a problem, and they tore it apart, I mean literally tore it apart. Never found the organism. We did find an area where a cross-contamination of raw milk and pasteurized milk could have taken place. But it would have had to have . . . I think there were three valves that would have had to fail at the same time in order for it to happen, which didn't seem logical. We did find that in one case we had the pipes taken down, and the night crew came in and put them back up again. So the day crew and the night crew weren't communicating. But the head of quality control at Jewell lost his job over it. That's quite a severe situation.

But we did have a lot of meetings with industry. Abbott and Jewell were the two leaders in manufacturing quality control in the central United States, in having an organization for quality control. I can't remember the guy's name now. Bill . . . The guy from Abbott. I can't remember his last name. Boy. That's the trouble with ten years. (Laughter)

RO: What were some of the major problems you had then as a DD and then as an RFDD?

WC: Well, the facility was always a problem in Chicago. We had a union in Chicago, but that was more of an asset than a liability. The post office was difficult to deal with, so I used the union to deal with the post office. I would call up the post office and say, "My union is complaining." And that would get more reaction than if I called and said, "I'm complaining." Because their union was very powerful, and the word union put the fear of God into the post office people. It seemed like it . . .

In fact, I remember one time they sealed the windows in Chicago with a compound that was not supposed to be used inside. We picked up on it, and I sent

everybody home. Somehow or another the press was coming in to interview somebody in the post office and picked up on that. They came up to interview me, and I was fine. I wasn't going to speak with them. But there were two people from the postmaster's office who were going to come up and bawl me out for sending the people home. The press saw them coming and took after them. They both took off running down the hall. (Laughter) They hid in the men's room so that these people couldn't interview them.

I called the postmaster after that. I said, "Look. We made a mistake. The best thing to do when you make a mistake is to admit it and go on about your business. Don't stand there and lie and don't try to outrun it, because you're going to be caught in it, and you're going to look bad." And he agreed finally. He just admitted they shouldn't have used it. But it was a daily hot zone. I mean it was a daily problem.

RO: What about money? Your budget?

WC: We never . . . There were some times when we would run into a problem with money when, you know, the continuing resolution would run out and . . . In fact, I remember it was during the botulism in canned vichyssoise soup. We were out making the recall, and Congress didn't pass the budget, and the continuing resolution didn't pass, and we had no money. Legally couldn't spend a nickel. I was very impressed with the people, I think probably across the country, but particularly Chicago, they took their own money, they all went to work, not knowing when they were going to get paid for it, nobody complained, and I was really proud of them. They did a fine job. They got it off the shelf, and they all got their money in the end. But they did it on faith more than they did it on, for any other reason. They were . . . And I think you'll find that true of Food & Drug people across the board back in those days.

RO: You mentioned that most of the district staff didn't think that an RFDD was really necessary and most of the field felt that the old EDRO (Executive Director of Regional Operations) headquarters, or whatever field headquarters unit there was, was unnecessary, too.

WC: Well, we were forced into it because of the ten regions that was HEW, and HEW wanted to control the Food & Drug and the field. And when I first started as district director in Chicago, once in a while we would talk to the guy who was regional director, and that was it. Then as they got more political, they wanted to have more control, and they insisted on the Food & Drug having the regional offices. When they made the district directors regional directors, it didn't create too much of a problem. But then when the hierarchy shifted up one step and became a separate entity . . .

I think it was common knowledge that all Food & Drug people had that position, because you remember when we went from ten regions down to seven. That created a lot of waves in HEW, because they saw themselves losing control. Because there was no idea who was going to service, what was going to be the servicing personnel office for seven regions versus ten. And first of all, if Food & Drug can go down to seven, they can go down to seven. They were very nervous about that.

Perhaps it would work with a smaller number of regions, but when you had ten regions and you only had twenty-one districts, you only had two-to-one ratio overall, and some were just one-to-one, like Seattle. The one-to-ones didn't make any sense on the face of it. The four-to-ones, like Chicago and New York, probably made some kind of sense, because we had a larger pool of money which could be shifted when an emergency moved from one place to another, and we could partially specialize our laboratories. And particularly, if we really tried to work and help each other out, it worked pretty good. But it wasn't . . . You know, I think we probably would have done it anyway without that support, so . . .

In terms of the regional, there were some regional programs, like the milk program and the food program. But for two programs, we needed a regional director? I still don't think we do. That's my own personal point of view. It just made it a longer chain of command. It might have been more difficult for Paul Hile to manage twenty-one people.

RO: Well, under Commissioner Goddard, Goddard had the district directors reporting directly to him. That was before FDA was organized into the regions.

WC: Yes, you were reporting directly to the commissioner then.

RO: And that, you know, didn't work.

WC: Well, that's one of the things that I liked about Dr. Young. In fact, he even stayed in my house one night. He made an effort to get to know everybody, get to know what the field operation was about. I think it was his concept for a separate block of money for emergencies. We would run out of money when there was an emergency sometimes. And he was able to separate the operational funds from the emergency funds and made the operational funds a known amount, so that we could manage the routine. When we needed money to draw on from the emergency funds, we could do it, and then we'd just go to Congress and ask them to replace it. You might know more about that than I do.

RO: That happened after I left.

WC: Was it? But it really worked. He was a very brilliant man, too. I remember him walking through the lab, and they could not pull the wool over his eyes. He knew the equipment, he knew how it worked, and you just didn't snow him. In fact,

I remember one particular chemist in Chicago had egg on his face talking to Dr. Young.

RO: Well, you talked a little bit about Dr. Young. What about some of the other commissioners?

WC: Well, Dr. Ley took over after Dr. Goddard, and he could walk right by you, and nobody would know he was there. I think he even admitted he shouldn't have been . . . He was made commissioner . . . I saw him change his mind three times in one meeting. Billy Goodrich was in the meeting, and he convinced Ley to go one direction. Then Ken Kirk walked in and made a suggestion, and Ley switched 180°. Then Winton Rankin walked in, and he switched back to Billy Goodrich's position. And I thought, "Gee. This guy could be maneuvered." He just . . . He didn't know what to do. He was an M.D., who had gotten put into a position of managing the field, which he knew nothing about, and he was in over his head.

Winton Rankin shortly after that went . . . When I went to the field, I lost, you know, I spent two years making all these contacts, and they all went out the window, because shortly after that, they fired, you know, they came in and fired them all.

RO: Well . . .

WC: Rankin was sent over to HEW in a little room with a telephone. I can tell you a story about that. When I was working for him, I lived in Baltimore, and down the block a ways was a fellow by the name of Spiro Agnew. Because I lived in the neighborhood, I got an invitation when he was selected as vice president to go to the Vice Presidential Ball. I mentioned it to Mr. Rankin, and he said, "Now, let me tell you a story."

And he told me the story about the fellow who . . . He said, "Now if you go in there, don't sign anything, don't tell them who you are. Just go and enjoy yourself. But if you're pegged as belonging to either one of the political parties, when the other one gets in, you've had it." And as long as I worked for Mr. Rankin, I never knew if he was Republican or Democrat. He was just the glue that kept the organization together back then. He and Ken Kirk.

RO: Well, you mentioned Ley, and Ley was, you know, just kind of put in there because Goddard had left, and . . .

WC: Right, and he was . . . It was night and day difference.

RO: Well, sure, and it was really, as far as HEW was concerned, they wanted somebody from the outside, and so Ley was there as kind of a caretaker, I guess, until they found somebody else. And he'd probably be the first one to admit that he shouldn't have been there.

WC: Well, I can remember one management technique I learned from Mr. Rankin was when we'd have these weekly staff meetings. He had asked the Bureau of Medicine to do something. They said, "Well, we'd like to do it, Mr. Rankin, but we just don't have time." And Mr. Rankin would say, "Name three things that are more important." And they'd say, "When do you want it done?" That's a very good technique to remember, because a lot of times we got hung up in minutia.

In fact, he would give me a . . . He'd give an assignment. Shortly after giving the assignment, he would send me down to the bowels of the organization to find out whether it was a good assignment or a bad one. Was it going to create . . . Because what would happen in the staff meetings after that, the people would say, "We'll get it done for you," without any indication to how much effort or how much work was going to go into this assignment, and my job was to go find that out. Because if

it . . . In one case, it was going to have to pull all the records for practically every firm in their files, and the guy had agreed to do this, and it was going to tie up the whole bureau. When Mr. Rankin found it out, why, he canceled the assignment. He was . . .

There were a couple of other things that he . . . I just can't remember right now. I had it on the tip of my tongue when I was talking about it, and then I have forgotten it. But he was very good at that.

RO: Well, what about Charlie Edwards, who followed Ley?

WC: Well, I don't know if I should say this, but the scuttlebutt of it was he was "the man from Glad." I don't know if you remember that terminology or not. Apparently there was an ad on TV about Glad, and somehow or another he must have looked like Charlie Edwards or something. I don't really have any strong feelings about Charlie, other than the fact that he promoted me once. (Laughter)

RO: That's a plus.

WC: Which is a plus, right. And then the next one was Dr. Hayes, who I had a lot of respect for. He was . . . I didn't see a lot of Charlie Edwards out in the field, but I did see Dr. Hayes out there.

RO: Well, there were some in between there.

WC: All right. Let's see. There was Kennedy.

RO: Kennedy.

WC: Kennedy was a strong one, as I remember, who was the president of the University of Illinois Medical School.

RO: Schmidt?

WC: Dr. Schmidt was good. He was very . . . He came to the dedication. He'd already quit, but he came to the dedication of Chicago lab, which I thought was really neat. The thing about the FDA commissioners is even after they left they were loyal to FDA. Like Dr. Young told me, he said, "I feel that I owe my country something, and I'm offering them a few years of my service." He looked at it that way. Many of the commissioners after they'd left stuck together, and they would come to the defense of the agency collectively, regardless of what, you know, political party appointed them. They seemed to lose that when they became a part of Food & Drug.

The only real problem we had there was such a turnover rate after Goddard. After George P. Larrick. I met him three times in one day. The first time I met him I was in Chicago as a supervisor, and he walked through the door. I just happened to be there, and he says, "Hi. I'm George P. Larrick, and I'm the commissioner of Food & Drug." He says, "Can you direct me to the district director?" So I took him into the district director, and I went back into the lab. He was on a tour, and I was standing in the lab, and he came up, "My name's George P. Larrick." And then I went over to the storeroom. A little while later he comes into the storeroom, and he says, "Hi. I'm George Larrick." (Laughter) I've always remembered that. But there was a time when the commissioner knew everybody by their first name.

RO: Well, that surprises me what you mentioned about Larrick, because I'd always heard that Larrick met you once, and he knew you.

WC: Well, he probably did, because the third time I said, "This is the third time that . . ." I told him. I probably shouldn't have, but . . . He left shortly thereafter--I mean, he retired.

RO: Yes. Pretty much forced out.

WC: But the problem was they were about on a two-year cycle, and about the time they learned the agency, they were gone. There was a long learning curve. Most of them were M.D.s.

RO: Yes. I guess Goyan was the only one of that later group that wasn't an M.D. What year did you retire, Bill?

WC: Let's see. It would have been about '89, I think it was.

RO: Dr. Young was still commissioner.

WC: Yes, he was still commissioner then.

(Interruption)

RO: Bill, we've been discussing some of the commissioners that you served under. Anything else you'd like to add about any of your colleagues or anything else.

WC: Well, I considered . . . You know, when I retired, it was hard. I retired because the government was fooling around with our pension program. Do you remember when they were doing that? I kept coming back to the office, and then I said, "I've got to quit doing that, or whoever takes over after me is not going to be able to . . . I'm going to get in the way." So I just left and didn't come back for a

long time after that. I haven't been able to get down to the office since I've been in Florida. But they had Christmas parties sometimes before I came down here. I used to go to them.

RO: No regrets that you retired?

WC: Well, I probably would have had to, as it turns out, because of physical reasons. I did have . . . On my neck, nothing seems to work quite as well as it used to, and with all the travel, I can't . . . When I go into a motel, I have to blow up a mattress and sleep on it. I can't sleep on the bed, because I'm in so much pain. In fact, I . . . And you know how much traveling we did. I just probably wouldn't have been able to make it. Then I had . . . My dad got to be too much of a problem. I didn't want to saddle my wife it, and he lived to be . . . He just died in '93. He was ninety-four years old. He died in October '93. He used to go with me to some of the AFDO meetings, central states meetings. I would like to thank all the fine people in FDA.

RO: Well, Bill, I want to thank you for participating in our oral history program, and we'll end this interview then.

WC: Thanks.